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This is a study of agency in the field of criminal liability through an examination of three types of organisation: corporate actors in the field of business activity, states and governments, and delinquent or criminal organisations. It considers both the respective roles of individuals and organisations, and the allocation of criminal responsibility to these different kinds of actor.

Introduction -- The meaning of uplift in Punjab -- British Evangelicals vs Belgian Catholics -- The communication of Christianity -- Living in new traditions -- Visions of the future -- Conclusion -- Appendix: Capuchin missionaries arriving in and leaving Punjab, 1889-1930

Enforcement of the EU competition rules, especially in relation to cartels and cartelists, involves a complex jurisdictional patchwork, characterise by inconsistency but also a strong public rhetoric which masks policy and practical differences, Application of the rules to different legal categories of actor, geographical and jurisdictional diversity, and the uneven use of enforcement measures and sanctions give rise to a number of rule of law issues in the form of inconsistent treatment, uncertainty and lack of proportionality. The discussion here maps out and illustrates these problems and suggests that these should be addressed through a more critical consideration of the claims made for deterrence as an enforcement imperative in this context.

Discussion and argument concerning the deterrent impact of anticartel enforcement measures have gained in significance and controversy as the whole regulatory enterprise and rhetoric of cartel regulation has expanded and developed. Regulators have become ever more emphatic in the denunciation of business cartels, and deterrence has therefore assumed a significant role in the justification of a stronger and more determined effort of legal control. In particular, cartelists need to be deterred into whistle blowing for leniency programs to work, and businesses need to be deterred into compliance to achieve the ultimate regulatory goal. Deterrence (rather than, for instance, economic redistribution or retributive justice) then becomes a leading, perhaps the leading objective within the legal control of cartels. Yet claims of deterrent effect are notoriously difficult to measure and assess. The discussion here examines the underlying problems of penetrating and measuring the deterrent impact of anticartel policies and sanctions and considers the possible methodologies for assessing deterrence in this context.